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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case comes to the Court on an interlocutory appeal from the district court's 
grant to the Plaintiff/Respondent of leave to amend its Complaint to add a cause of action 
to enforce a claim of lien. The district court's discretionary grant of leave should be 
affirmed on appeal because the motion to amend timely coininenced proceedings to 
enforce the lien within the six-month limitations period set forth in Idaho Code $ 45-510, 
and because even if such motion had itself been untimely, it would relate back to the 
original complaint which arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence. 
11. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant Terra-West Inc. ("Terra-West") is a company based in Caldwell, Idaho, 
which specializes in excavation and preparing property for construction. In 2006, Terra- 
West agreed to provide Red Cliff Development Inc. ("Red Cliff') with excavation and 
irrigation related labor and materials for the development of an approximately 40 acre 
parcel of property to be known as the Sadie Creek Subdivision. R, p. 90. Terra-West 
began work in the August of 2006. R. p. 90. 
During the course of Terra-West's performance, Red Cliff entered into an 
agreement with Mike Unvin Enterprises ("Unvin") in which Urwin purchased the 
development from Red Cliff, and also assumed all obligations and agreements for the 
development, including Red Cliffs agreement with Terra-West. R. p. 90. Terra-West 
continued its performance through November 30, 2007, at which point the work remaining 
under the contract included certain excavation and irrigation work and the installation of 
pipelines. Further work, however, was impossible until Unvin could obtain government 
approval for certain other irrigation work required under the contract. 
Since Terra-West had not been fully paid for its work on the subdivision and was 
uncertain as to when Urwin would, if ever, obtain the necessary government approvals 
necessary for Terra-West to complete its work under its agreement with Red CliffIUrwin, 
Terra-West recorded a Claim of Lien with the Ada County Recorder on December 6, 2007. 
R. p. 91. This Claim of Lien was served upon the owners, or reputed owners, of the 
property the following day. R. p. 91. 
In May, 2008, Terra-West had still not been fully paid for its work. Accordingly, 
on May 30, 2008, Terra-West filed the present action in the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, which was within the 
six month statutory time period for the initiation of a foreclosure action pursuant to Idaho 
Code 5 45-510. R. p. 6-13. Terra-West's Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial included 
causes of action for foreclosure of its lien on the subdivision property against all persons 
and entities claiming an interest in the property, as well as for unjust enrichment and for 
breach of contract by Urwin. R. p. 6-13. The case was assigned to the Honorable Ronald 
J. Wilper. 
Idaho Mutual Trust, LLC, ("Idaho Mutual") brought a motion to dismiss with respect 
to the portion of the suit concerning foreclosure of Terra-West's lien. R. p. 28-29. On 
Septanber 3,2008, the district court ruled in favor of Idaho Mutual's motion, concluding that 
statement in the lien that the signer was "knowledgeable of the matters stated therein and 
verily believes the same to be true and just" was inadequate to satisfy the requirement in 
Idaho Code 5 45-507(4) that the lien claimant verify by oath that he or she believes the lien 
claim to be just. R. p. 31-34. The present suit continued however, since there were remaining 
claims to be resolved. Idaho Mutual did not seek, nor did it receive, an Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b) certificate of final judgment permitting it to exit the suit. 
Shortly before the suit was filed, Urwin notified Terra-West that it had finally 
received government approval (with certain conditions) to complete the Sadie Creek 
Subdivision. Urwin instructed Terra-West to resume work pursuant to the 2006 contract. 
Terra-West complied, providing labor and materials for the improveinent of the property until 
its work on the Sadie Creek Subdivision was substantially completed on May 25,2008. R. p. 
91. 
Less than 90 days later, on August 12,2008, Terra-West filed a Second Claim of Lien 
with the Ada County Recorder, reflecting the additional work performed and the new amount 
owed to Terra-West as a result. R. p. 91. A copy of this Second Claim of Lien was served by 
certified mail upon the owners, or reputed owners, of the property. R. p. 91. 
Terra-West remained unpaid for its work, and so less than six months later, on 
January 16, 2006, Terra-West moved to amend its Complaint in the present action to recover 
pursuant to the Second Claim of Lien. R. p. 37-62. The district court granted the motion to 
amend on April 22, 2009, and the Amended Coinplaint was filed the following day. R. p. 80- 
110. Idaho Mutual filed a motion seeking permission to appeal from the district court's 
interlocutory order, which was denied. Idaho Mutual then sought and received permission 
fioin the Idaho Supreme Court to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rule 12. Idaho Mutual's appeal is now before the Court. 
111. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Is Terra-West entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 5 
12-121? 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) states that "a party may amend a pleading only by 
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires ...." I.R.C.P. 15(a); see also Clarlc v. Olsen, I10 Idaho 323, 326,715 P.2d 
993, 996 (1986); Smith v. Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 149, 350 P.2d 348 (1960); Marlrstaller v. 
Markrtaller, 80 Idaho 129, 134, 326 P.2d 994 (1958). Idaho courts "should favor liberal 
grants of leave to amend." Wickstrom v. North Idaho College, 11 1 Idaho 450, 725 P.2d 
[Tlhe purpose of the rule is two-fold: First, to allow the best chance for each 
claim to be determined on its merits rather than on some procedural 
technicality; and, second, to relegate pleadings to the limited role of 
providing parties with notice of the nature of the pleader's claim and the 
facts that have been called into question. Issue formulation is to be left to 
the discovery process and pleadings are not to be viewed as carrying the 
burden of fact revelation or of controlling the trial phase of the action. 
Clark, 110 Idaho at 326, 715 P.2d at 996 (citing C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure, Civil 2d § 1471 (1 971)). 
New theories of recovery may be raised when the basic facts that gave rise to the 
recovery have not changed. Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 272-73, 561 
P.2d 1299, 1305-06 (1977). The Idaho Supreme Court has "placed the burden of showing 
why a court should not grant leave to amend a complaint on the parties opposed to the 
amendment." Clark, 110 Idaho at 326, 715 P.2d at 996; Smith, 98 Idaho at 272-73, 561 
P.2d at 1305-06. "Amendment to pleadings should be allowed within the discretion of the 
trial court, and such exercise of discretion will not be disturbed absent a showing of clear 
error." Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 270, 688 P.2d 1172, 1175 (1984). Alnendlnent 
should be allowed "unless to do so would deprive the complaining party of some 
substantial right." Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 875, 673 
P.2d 1067, 1069 (1983). 
"The purpose of the mechanic's lien statutes is remedial in nature and seeks to provide 
protection to laborers and Inaterialmen who have added directly to the value of the property of 
another by their materials and labor." Baker v. Boren, 129 Idaho 885, 934 P.2d 951 (Ct.App. 
1997). Idaho's "lien statutes are to be liberally construed 'with a view to effect their objects 
and promote justice."' Id. (quoting Metropolitan L fe  Ins. Co. v. First Security Bank ofldaho, 
94 Idaho 489,493,491 P.2d 1261,1265 (1971)). 
V. ARGUMENT 
Idaho Mutual's interlocutory appeal is predicated on its theory that the amendment 
to Terra-West's complaint to include the Second Clailn of Lien was untimely. Idaho 
Mutual's argument, however, is without merit for two reasons. First, the Second Claim of 
Lien was timely since it was filed within 90 days of the coinpletion of work in compliance 
with Idaho Code § 45-507, and proceedings to enforce the lien were commenced by the 
motion to amend within six months after the claim of lien was filed. Second, even if the 
motion to amend Terra-West's complaint had not commenced enforcement proceedings, 
the amended complaint would nonetheless be timely because pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 15(c) it would relate back to the date the original complaint was filed. 
A. The Amended Complaint was timely because the operative date for the 
commencement of proceedings to enforce the Second Claim of Lien was the date 
the motion to amend was filed. 
Idaho's mechanic's lien statutes provide that one who "surfaces or otherwise 
improves any land" has a lien upon the land for the labor, materials, and services furnished. 
I.C. 5 45-501. The relevant time constraints are set out in two statutes: Idaho Code 5 45- 
507 and Idaho Code 5 45-510. The first of these, Idaho Code 45-507, provides that any 
claim of lien must be "filed within ninety (90) days after the completion of the labor or 
services, or furnishing of materials." I.C. 5 45-507(2). The second statute, Idaho Code 5 
45-510, provides that in order to enforce such a lien, proceedings must be commenced 
within six months of the date the lien was filed. 
In the present case, Terra-West substantially completed work on the subject 
property on May 25, 2008. The Second Claim of Lien was filed with the Ada County 
Recorder on August 12, 2008, and copies were served 011 the owners or reputed owners of 
the property. This filing was less than 90 days after worlc was completed, and was thus 
timely under Idaho Code 3 45-507. Then, on January 16, 2009, Terra-West filed a motion 
to amend its coinplaint so as to enforce the Second Claim of Lien. This motion was filed 
approximately five months after the Claim of Lien was recorded, and was accordingly 
timely under the six-month limit imposed pursuant to Idaho Code 3 45-510. 
Idaho Mutual's argument that the amendment was untimely is based on drawing a 
distinction between the date the motion to amend was filed - which was less than six 
months after the lien was filed - and the date the district court actually issued its ruling 
approving the motion - which was more than six months after the lien was filed. Idaho 
Mutual asserts that a lnotion to amend an existing complaint cannot "commence" an action 
pursuant to Idaho Code 5 45-510 because an amended. complaint is not deemed to be filed 
until it is submitted following a grant of leave to amend by the court. Idaho Mutual 
contends that a claimant in Terra-West's position seeking to meet the six month statutory 
period must either (1) file a lnotion to amend and hope that the district court issues its 
ruling quickly, or (2) file a new colnplaint beginning a second action concerning the 
performance of the same contract, effect service to all the same parties again, and then 
move to consolidate that second lawsuit to the action already pending. 
The difficulty with Idaho Mutual's argument is that the rule it proposes - that an 
amended complaint is not deemed filed for timeliness purposes until it is submitted as a 
separate document after a formal grant of leave by the court - does not actually exist. 
Indeed, the firmly established rule is the exact opposite of that suggested by Idaho Mutual. 
"[Tlhe settled rule in both federal and state court is that a colnplaint is deemed filed as of 
the time it is submitted to a court together with a request for leave to file the amended 
pleading." Buller Tvuclcing Co. v. Owner Operator Independent Driver Risk Retention 
Group, Inc, 461 F.Supp.2d 768,776-77 (S.D. Ill. 2006). Once filed, "the motion to ainend 
stands in place of the actual ainended complaint while the motion is under review by the 
court." Frazier v. East Tenn. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 55 S. W.3d 925 (Tenn. 2001). It is the 
filing of the motion to amend, not the court's later ruling on the motion or the even later 
subnlission of the amended complaint that determines the date on which the action is 
"commenced" for the purposes of Rule 3. Nett v. Bellucci, 774 N.E.2d 130, 138-39 (Mass. 
2002). 
The application of the rule is illustrated in Mauney v. Morris, 340 S.E.2d 397 (N.C. 
1986), where the North Carolina Supreme Court considered a set of facts siinilar to the 
present case and under a siinilar procedural posture. In Mauney, the plaintiff filed a 
complaint which he later moved to amend to add a claim of lien. Id. at 399. At the time 
the plaintiff filed his motion to ainend, the claim of lien was within the statutory time limit. 
Id. at 400. However, by the time the trial court got around to ruling on the motion to 
amend the following month, that time limit had expired. Id. Applying the national rule, 
the Mauney court rejected the same argument now offered by Idaho Mutual, observing that 
"[tlhe date of the filing of the motion, rather than the date that the court rules on it, is the 
crucial date in measuring the period of limitations." Id. Accordingly, the court in Mauney 
held that the plaintiffs amendment to add a claim of lien was timely based on the date the 
motion to amend was filed - without regard to the date on which the trial court actually 
ruled on the motion or on which the amended complaint itself was submitted. Id. 
The reason for the rule was set out in the frequently quoted case of Gloster v. Penn. 
Railroad Co., 214 F.Supp. 207,208 (W.D. Penn. 1963). The court wrote: 
The filing of the complaint, and not final court approval was sufficient to 
meet the requirements of Rule 3. . . . To give sanction to objections to the 
a~neud~nent, that leave to amend must await the actual placement of the 
judge's signature on an order to amend, would to lend impracticality and 
injustice to federal judicial process and procedure. . . . The Court had need 
for researching and deliberating upon the law as applied to the facts of the 
case, and this had to be done while applying time and energy to the many 
other matters in a busy court. The necessary time so consumed . . . should 
not and cannot be permitted as an obstacle to justice. Such is the 
intendment and spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Id. Another court summarized the basis of the rule by noting that "[ilf the date of 
commencement is based on when the court grants the motion to amend rather than when 
the plaintiff files the motion and proposed complaint, the plaintiff is left with uncertainty 
over whether the statute of limitations requirelnents will ever be met. The matter is out of 
the hands of the plaintiff and is controlled by the vagaries of the court's workload. The 
better rule is that the action is commenced when the plaintiff files the motion to anlend and 
the proposed complaint irrespective of when the court grants the motion to amend." The 
Children's Store v. Cody Enterprises, Inc., 580 A.2d 1206, 1210 (Vt. 1990) (emphasis in 
the original). 
The Supreme Judicial Court o f  Massachusetts set forth a particularly thorough 
analysis o f  the rule in Nett v. Bellucci, 774 N.E.2d 130 (Mass. 2002). The court wrote: 
While the plaintiff has unilateral control over when [the motion to amend] 
is filed, the plaintiff has no way o f  controlling or even predicting the time at 
which any permission to amend will be granted, and thus no ability to 
control the date on which the amended conlplaint itself may be filed. It may 
take only a matter o f  days before the motion is allowed and the complaint 
can be filed, but it may be a matter o f  weeks, or even months, depending on 
a host o f  factors, all o f  which are outside the plaintiffs control. I f  the 
statute o f  repose cannot be satisfied until the later filing o f  the amended 
complaint after the motion to amend has been allowed, the repose period 
will effectively be shortened by sonle unpredictable amount o f  time, as a 
plaintiff would have to file the motion to ainend some considerable period 
in advance o f  the expiration o f  the repose period and si~nply hope that the 
court's ruling would be sufficiently prompt. It is only that first step, the 
filing o f  the motion, that the plaintiff can control. Thus, the filing o f  the 
motion is colnparable to the original filing o f  the complaint, both in the 
sense that each is the first step that the plaintiff takes and the first document 
that the plaintiff files with the court concerning the action, and in the sense 
that both the filing o f  the original coinplaint and the filing o f  the motion to 
amend are steps that remain unilaterally in the plaintiffs control. 
Id. at 136. 
The court in Nett considered and rejected the process proposed in the present case 
by Idaho Mutual: that a plaintiff seeking to timely amend its complaint should he required 
to file and serve an entirely new lawsuit, and then move to consolidate the new lawsuit 
with the action already pending between the parties. Id. at 136-37. The court noted that 
requiring such a process would waste tiine and judicial resources, as well as encourage 
undesirable litigation tactics. Id. The court observed that the approach now urged by 
Idaho Mutual: 
would waste scarce judicial resources and impose pointless litigation costs. . 
. . [I]t creates needless confusion and duplication to force the plaintiff to 
bring the claiin as a separate action, followed by a motion for consolidation, 
merely to avoid the bar o f  the statute o f  repose. Indeed, the plaintiff might 
well file a motion to amend, wait to see whether the motion would be 
allowed in time to get the amended complaint filed before the repose period 
ran out, and, i f  there were still no ruling from the court as the expiration 
date drew near, file the separate action and the accompanying motion to 
consolidate. W e  fail to see how such duplication o f  effort and procedural 
clutter would advance the purposes underlying the statute o f  repose. 
Id. at 136-37. ' ' 
The volume o f  reported decisions applying the rule that a inotion to amend stands 
in the place o f  an amended coinplaint while the motion is under review by the court 
precludes an exhaustive listing o f  such cases. The following, however, is a non-exhaustive 
sampling: Schillinger v. Union Pacffic Railroad Co., 425 F.3d 330, 334-35 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(courts look to the date the motion to amend was filed when determining the timeliness o f  
an amended complaint); Newby v. Enron Corp., 542 F.3d 463, 470 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(detennining timeliness o f  an amended complaint based on the date o f  the inotion to 
amend); Moore v. State ofIndiana, 999 F.2d 1125, 1131 (7th Cir. 1993) (motion to amend 
satisfies limitations period in place o f  the later amended complaint); Mayes v. AT & T 
Information Systems, Inc., 867 F.2d 1172, 1173 (8th Cir. 1989) (motion to amend 
constitutes the "cominencement" o f  an action for the purposes o f  Rule 3 in lieu o f  later 
amended complaint); Buller Trucking Co, 461 F.Supp.2d at 776-77 ("the settled rule i11 
both federal and state court is that a complaint is deemed filed as o f  the time it is submitted 
to a court together with a request for leave to file the amended pleading"); Bradley v. 
Armstrong Rubber Co., 46 F.Supp.2d 583, 586-87 (S.D. Miss. 1999) (where motion to 
amend was filed within the statutory period, it stands in place o f  the later amended 
motion); In re Glacier Bay, 746 F.Supp. 1379, 1389-90 (D.Alaska 1990) (amended 
complaint was timely where the motion to amend was filed within the limitations period); 
Wallace v. Shenvin Williams Co., Inc., 720 F.Supp. 158-59 (D.Kan. 1988) ("The court 
holds that plaintifl's amended complaint was effectively filed when his motion for leave to 
file an amended coinplaint was filed on May 20, 1988. To hold otherwise would punish 
plaintiff and other similarly situated plaintiffs for the court's unavoidable delay in issuing 
an order granting leave to amend a complaint"); Pearson v. Niagara Machine & Tool 
Works, 701 F.Supp. 195, 196 (N.D. Okla. 1988) (amendments timely where motion to 
amend was submitted within the statutory period); Eaton Covp. v. Appliance Valves Co., 
634 F.Supp. 974, 982-83 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (amended co~nplaint timely if the motion for 
leave to amend was submitted within the statutory period); Longo v. Penn. Electric Co., 
618 F.Supp. 87 (W.D. Penn. 1985) ("The timely filing of this Motion to Amend and not 
the final coui-l approval was sufficient to meet the requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 3 that 'a 
civil action is colninenced by the filing of a complaint with the court"'); Glosler, 214 
F.Supp. at 208 (filing of the motion to amend constituted commencement of an action); 
Nett, 774 N.E.2d at 139-40 ("We find considerable supporting authority in other 
jurisdictions, which (in the absence of any 'relation back' provisions) take the position that 
the filing of the motion to amend, not the court's later ruling on that motion or the even 
later filing of the complaint following allowance of that that motion, is the date on which 
the new action is commenced"); Totura & Co., Znc. v. Williams, 754 So.2d 671, 680 (Fla. 
2000) ("under proper analysis, the motion to amend was sufficient to stand in place of an 
amended complaint and the action was, therefore, deemed commenced"); Perez v. 
Paramount Communications, Inc., 709 N.E.2d 83, 86-87 (N.Y. 1999) (timeliness of 
amended complaint is based on the date the motion to amend was filed); Frazier, 55 
S.W.3d at 930 ("the motion to amend stands in place of the actual amended complaint 
while the motion is under review by the court"); The Children's Store, 580 A.2d at 1209- 
10 ("The state and federal courts that have confronted this question have held that an 
action against a new party, brought in through amendment to a preexisting complaint, is 
commenced when the motion to amend, and the new complaint, is filed even though 
permission to make the amendment is given at a later date"); Mauney v. Morris, 340 
S.E.2d 397,400 (N.C. 1986) ("The timely filing of the motion to amend, if later allowed, is 
sufficient to start the action within the period of limitations"); A.M.C.B. v. Cox, 292 
S.W.3d 428, 434-35 (Mo. App. 2009) (requirements for "commencing an action are met 
when a lnotion to amend is filed even if the trial court does not grant the motion until after 
the lilnitation period"); Toy v. Katz, 961 P.2d 1021, 1037 (Ariz.App. 1997) (motion to 
amend constitutes "commence~nent" of an action); R.A. Jones & Sons, Inc. v. Holman, 470 
So.2d 60, 65 (Fla. App. 1985) (for timeliness purposes, a motion to amend is "considered 
filed at the time of filing the motion for leave to amend"); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Emsco 
Homes, Inc.., 93 A.D.2d 874, 875 (N.Y. App.Div. 1983) ("service of a notice of lnotion 
and the proposed amended complaint upon a defendant prior to the expiration of the 
applicable Statute of Limitations timely interposes the claim or claims asserted in the 
amended complaint"); Smith v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So.2d 878, 879 (Fla.App. 
1976) (a motion for leave to amend filed within the statutory period stands in the place of 
the actual amendment); see also 54 C.J.S. Limitations ofActions § 287 ("when a motion to 
amend a complaint and a proposed amended cornplaint are filed prior to the running of the 
statute of limitations, the motion to amend stands in place of the actual amended complaint 
while the lnotion is under review by the trial court, and the fact that an order granting the 
lnotion to anlend is entered after expiration of the statute of limitations does not make the 
amended colnplaint untimely"). 
In support of its proposed alternative to the rule, Idaho Mutual points to Viajax 
Corp. v. Stuckenbrock, 134 Idaho 65,995 P.2d 835 (Ct.App. 2000). In its brief on appeal, 
Idaho Mutual asserts that in Viafax the Idaho Court of Appeals "expressly held" that the 
filing of a motion to amend does not coilstitute the filing of a complaint. Appellant's Brief; 
at 8. Following this assertion, Idaho Mutual added a block quote from the Viafax decision 
purporting to demonstrate the claimed holding. Appellant's Brief; at 8-9.' 
Viafax contains no such holding. Even if one were to analogize a motion to amend 
the complaint with the coullterclaim at issue in that case, a reading of Viafax demonstrates 
that the case is distiilguishable and does not contradict (or even pertain to) the national rule 
that a tilnely filed motion to amend a complaint stands in place of the later amended 
complaint. 
The pertinent facts in Viafax were as follows: the defendant moved for leave to file 
a counterclaim, and served this motion 011 the plaintiff. Id. at 67-68, 995 P.2d at 837-38. 
The plaintiff did not respond. Id. The district court granted the defendant's motion for 
leave to file the counterclaim, but this order was not served on the plaintiff. Id. at 68, 995 
P.2d at 838. Later, at a hearing conducted without notice to the plaintiff, the defendant 
moved for a default judgment on the counterclaim since no responsive pleading had been 
filed; the district court subsequently granted the motion for default. Id. When the plaintiff 
learned that a default judgment had been entered against it, it moved to set aside the 
judgment on the grounds that it had never been served with the coullterclaim and thus was 
' Ol~e  of sevcral difficulties with Idaho Mutual's use of Viafax is that the f i n f a  decision did not involve or 
discuss a motion to amend a complaint, but instead concerned a motion to file a counterclaim. Idaho 
Mutual's solution to this problem was to remove the word "counterclaim" every time it appeared in the text 
being quoted (five times) and I-eplace it with the bracketed wol-ds "amended complaint." Appellant's Brief; at 
8-9. The actual text of the decision in Viafav does not, of course, contain Idaho Mutual's alterations, and 
thus the 'express holding' claimed by Idaho Mutual does not exist. 
not aware that a responsive pleading called for. Id. The trial court denied the plaintiffs 
motion for relief, hut that ruling was reversed on appeal by the Idaho Court of Appeals. Id. 
The Court of Appeals in Viafax reasoned that the plaintiff was entitled to relief 
from the default judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l) which provides such relief based 
on "surprise." The Viafan plaintiff was "surprised" by the default judgment because the 
plaintiff was never served with the order granting leave to file the counterclaim, nor was 
the plaintiff served with the counterclaim itself. Id. Since the plaintiff was never given 
notice that there was a counterclaim, the plaintiff was excused from having failed to file a 
responsive pleading, and the grant of a default judgment against the plaintiff in Viafax was 
judged improper. Id, 
With the issues that were in dispute in Viufax in mind, it would be appropriate to 
revisit the language from that decision on which Idaho Mutual relies. The full paragraph 
from which Idaho Mutual selected a portion states as follows: 
The district court focused upoil the fact that Viafax [the plaintiffj was 
served with Stuckenhrock's [the defendant] motion for leave to file the 
coulrterclaim. Viafax has acknowledged receipt of this motion and does not 
challenge the validity of the service made on its attorney on the day of the 
attorney's withdrawal. However, in our view the district court erred in 
concluding that service of this motion alone was sufficient to put Viafax at 
risk of a default judgment. Service of a motion for leave to file a 
counterclaim, even with the proposed counterclaim attached, is not the 
equivalent of service of the counterclaim itself. As Viafax argues, receipt of 
the motion gave it notice only that it could object to a counterclaim being 
filed and that the inotion might be granted. It remained possible that the 
court would deny the motion, even without ail objection from Viafax, or 
that Stuckenbrock would abandon the effort. Filing and service of the 
counterclaim itself could be properly accomplished only uftev permission 
had been obtained from the court. See I.R.C.P. 13(e); 15(d). Such service 
was never performed. 
Id. The court in Viafan was discussing the requirement that a plaintiff must be wit11 
notice of a counterclaim (rather than only a motion for leave to file a counterclaim) 
he can be required to submit a res~onsive pleading and before a default judgment can be 
entered against him; it did not concern or discuss the point at which filing is effective to 
commence an action for the purpose of timeliness. 
In Nett, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted that the same principle 
expressed in Viafax is actually consistent with the rule that an motion to amend 
commences proceedings for the purposes of timeliness. 744 N.E.2d at 140-41. 
Iininediately following a sentence in which the court wrote: "[wle adopt the more accurate 
foimulation that the filing of the motion to amend actually commences the new action for 
these purposes, with the motion to amend 'standling] in the place o f  the amended 
complaint," the court placed a footnote in which it observed that: "[w]hile the filing of the 
motion 'commences' the action for purposes of satisfying a statute of repose, that filing 
does not trigger the new defendant's obligation to serve a responsive pleading. That 
obligation does not arise until the new defendant is served with the amended complaint, 
which will not occur unless and until the motion to amend is allowed." Nett, 744 N.E.2d at 
140-41 n.14 (internal citations omitted). In short then, a motion to amend (1) commences 
proceedings and stands in the place of the later amended pleading for the purposes of 
timeliness, but (2) the motion to amend does not trigger the other party's obligation to file 
a responsive pleading, which does come due until after the motion is approved and the 
amended pleading has been served. The first rule is determinative in this case. The second 
is the principle applied in Viafax. As observed in Nett, both rules are correct, and the two 
rules are entirely compatible. Nett, 744 N.E.2d at 140-41 n.14. 
Accordingly, nothing in the Viafax decision contradicts, or is even relevant to, the 
established rule that for the purposes of timeliness a motion to amend stands in the place of 
an amended complaint while the motion is under review by the court. See, e.g., Nett, 774 
N.E.2d 135-39; Mauney, 340 S.E.2d at 400-01; Buller Trucln'ng Co., 461 F.Supp.2d at 
776-77. 
The other decision that Idaho Mutual points to in its briefing is Diehl Lumber 
Transportation, Inc., v. Miclzelson, 802 P.2d 739 (Utah.App. 1990). However, as the 
district court in the present case noted, Diehl is distinguishable because that case concerned 
a party seeking to file a third-party complaint against an unrelated party with no notice, and 
revolved around the validity of a nzmc pro tune order. R., p. 83. Further, Dielzl is 
inapplicable in light of Utah's unique statutory scheme, in which a claimant is required not 
only to commence an action to enforce a lien within the statutory period, but also to record 
a lispendens on the property within the same time frame. See Utah Code § 38-1-1 1(3)(a); 
Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrft & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 752 (Utah 
1990); see and compare I.C. 5 45-510. 
Applying the established rule to the present case, Terra-West's timely filing of its 
 notion to amend stood in place of the amended complaint itself while the motion was 
under review by the district court. Terra-West had control over the date it filed the motion 
to anlend, but it could not control the timing of the court's subsequent ruling approving the 
motion. If Terra-West or similarly situated litigants seeking to amend a complaint were 
instead compelled to file and serve a new action against the same parties with respect to the 
same contract, and to then consolidate the action, such a cumbersome work-around would 
result in pointless procedural clutter and would waste time and judicial resources. "The 
settled mle in both federal and state court is that an colnplaint is deemed filed as o f  the 
time it is submitted to a court together with a request for leave to file the amended 
complaint." Buller Trucking, 461 F.Supp.2d at 776-77. Accordingly, Terra-West's 
a~nended complaint was timely filed, and the district court's order granting leave to amend 
was not an abuse o f  discretion. 
B. Even if the filing of proceedings to enforce the Second Claim of Lien had itself 
been untimely, it would relate back to the date of the original complaint because it 
relates to the same transaction and occurrence which was already put at issue in 
this litigation. 
As discussed in the prior section, since the commencenlent o f  proceedings to 
enforce the Second Lien was itself timely, its validity is not dependent on either the timing 
or the viability o f  the claims described in the original complaint, including the foreclosure 
claim on the First Lien. Consequently, i f  the Court agrees that Terra-West's motion to 
amend stood in place o f  the later amended complaint, then the motion to amend was 
properly granted and the analysis o f  the present appeal need go no 
I f ,  however, the Court were to determine that a motion to amend does stand in 
place o f  the amended pleading while the motion is under review by the trial court, it would 
then be necessary to consider whether Terra-West's amended complaint relates back to the 
date o f  the original complaint. The doctrine by which an amended pleading may relate 
back to the date o f  the original pleading is governed by Idaho Rule o f  Civil Procedure 
15(c). Rule 15(c) provides in pertinent part that "[w]henever a claim or defense asserted in 
the amended pleading arose out o f  the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
The district court's iuling granting leave to amend was based on the second lien relating back to the date of 
the original complaint pursuant to Ida110 Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). R. p. 83-85. That luling was comect 
and should be upheld on appeal. The district court was not, however, asked to consider the ~ u l e  that an 
amended complaint is deemed filed on the date of the motion to amend. That rule is presented on appeal 
because ail appellate court may affirm the trial court on a theory not relied upon below. McCuslcey v. Canyon 
Country, 123 Idaho 657,663,851 P.2d 953,959 (1993). 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of 
the original pleading." I.R.C.P. 15(c). 
In the present case, if the amended complaint had been untimely any such defect 
would be cured because the claims addressed in the amended pleading arose from the same 
circumstances as the original complaint, and thus relate back to the date of the timely filed 
original pleading. In ruling on the motion to amend, the district court below found that 
"the [second] lien attached to the same real property and arose from the same tra~isaction 
[as set forth in thc original complaint]. The Court finds that the claim arises out of the 
transaction set forth in the original pleading and therefore amendment relates back to that 
date." R. p. 84. 
On appeal, Idaho Mutual has recast its 'relation back' argument away from its 
former assertion that the amended complaint did not arise out of the same conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence as the original pleading. Idaho Mutual's new argument is that 
the amended complaint does not relate back "[b]ecause the Original Complaint did not 
give notice of the Second Lien or that additional work might be performed pursuant to 
Terra-West's contract for improvement to the Property[.]" Appellant's BuieL at 13. In 
other words, Idaho Mutual's argument is that the amended complaint does not relate back 
because the original complaint did not mention the Second Lien or the additional work on 
the property that was performed after the original complaint was filed. 
Idaho Mutual's argument stresses the requirement of "notice," contending that 
Idaho Mutual did not receive notice of the Second Lien because it was not specifically 
discussed in the original complaint.3 Idaho Mutual's argument, however, misunderstands 
the role of "notice" in the context of the relation back doctrine. 
First, it should be remembered that the test for relation back is whether the new 
.claims asserted in the amended pleading "arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading." FZerrera v. 
Conner, 111 Idaho 1012, 1016-17, 729 P.2d 1075, 1079-80 (Ct.App. 1986). This 
"common core of operative facts" imparts the defendant with notice as to claims arising 
from those circuinstances. F.D.I.C. v. Jackson, 133 F.3d 694, 702 (9th Cir. 1998). It is the 
original filing of a suit that places a defendant on notice that "the whole trailsaction 
described in it will be fully sifted, by amendment if necd be, and that the form of the action 
or the relief prayed or the law relied on will not be confined to their first statement." 6A 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 3 1497, 93 (2d ed. 1990) (quoting 
Barthel v. Stamm, 145 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1944)). 
Idaho Mutual's argument also depends on a suggestion that an amended pleading 
cannot relate back unless those claims sought to be added were already contained in the 
original pleading. It is not, however, necessary for the exact claims in the amended 
pleading to be already contained in the original pleading, so long as the new claims arose 
out the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence. See Herreua, 11 1 Idaho at 1018, 729 
Terra-West understands Idaho Mutual's argument on appeal as concerning notice rather than the argument 
presented below that the amended complaint did not arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence 
as set forth in the original pleading. Such an argument was properly rejected below as impermissibly seeking 
to litigate the merits of a claim on a motion lo amend. "A court may consider whether the allegations sought 
to be added to the complaint slate a valid claim in determining whether to grant leave to amend the 
complaint. A court, however, may not consider the sufficiency of evidence supporling the claim sought to be 
added in determining leave to amend because that is more properly determined at the summary judgment 
stage." Estate ofBeclcer v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 527-28, 96 P.3d 623, 628-29 (2004) (internal citations 
omitted). "[Ilt is generally inappropriate to consider the substantive merits of the claim sought to be added 
when passing on a motion to amend." Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Association, 126 Idaho 1002, 
1013, 895 P.2d 1195,1206 (1995). 
P.2d at 1081. Indeed, the very purpose of Rule 15 "is to allow amendments to expand or 
cure defective pleadings." Id. at 1017, 729 P.2d at 1080. Logically, if, as Idaho Mutual 
insists, an amended or supplemental claim would be disallowed if it was not already 
contained in the original pleading, amended or supplemental claims could never relate 
back. After all, if the original pleading already contained the claims or amendments being 
added, there would be no need for the addition or amendment in the first place. This flaw 
in the argument now being advanced by Idaho Mutual was aptly addressed in Scarfone v. 
Martin, 442 So.2d 282,283 (Fla. App. 1983). The court wrote: 
[Tlhe proper test of relation back of amendments is not whether the cause 
of action stated in the amended pleading is identical to that stated in the 
original (for in the strict sense almost any amendment may be said to be a 
change of the original cause of action), but whether the pleading as 
amended is based upon the same specific conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence between the parties upon which the plaintiff tried to enforce 
his original claim. If the amendment shows the same general factual 
situation as that alleged in the original pleading, then the amendinent 
relates back - even though there is a change in the precise legal 
description of the rights sought to be enforced, or a change in the legal 
theory upon which the action is brought. 
Id. (quoting Keel v. Brown, 162 So.2d 321, 323 (Fla. App. 1964)).~ 
Idaho Mutual's apparent argument that the amended complaint does not relate back because it includes 
claims for work on the property performed after the original complaint was filed is similarly without merit. 
Amending a pleading pursuant to Rule 15 to add claims that have arisen since the date of the original 
pleading is not barred, and does not inhibit relation back of the new claims. Such pleadings, to the extent that 
they concern events subsequent to the original pleading, are called "supplemental pleadings." I.R.C.P. 15(d); 
Mauney, 340 S.E.2d at 401 n.1 ("Supplemental pleadings are distinguished from amendments because they 
deal with acts occurring after the filing of the complaint"). Supplen~ental pleadings are specifically permitted 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), which provides that a party may "serve a supplemental 
pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the 
pleading sought to be supplen~euted, whether or not the original pleading is defective in its statement of a 
claim of relief," I.R.C.P. 15(d). "The clear weight of authority . . . in both the cases and the commentary, 
permits the bringing of new claims in a supplemental complaint to promote the ecoilomical and speedy 
disposition of the controversy." Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1988). 
Supplemental pleadings relate back to the date of the original pleading in the same manner as 
alnendments to pleadings under Rule 15(c). See Duffv. Draper, 96 Idaho 299, 527 P.2d 1257 (1974) ("Rule 
15(c), I.R.C.P., provides that amendments to pleadings are to relate back in time to the commencement of 
suit, as are supplemental pleadings"). 
There is no question that the district court was correct in its determination that the 
Amended Complaint arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the 
original Complaint. The amendment seeks only to add additional services and inaterials 
rendered that were required under the oricrinal contract between Terra-West and Red 
CliffIUrwin. The original pleading puts at issue labor and materials required under a 
contract entered into in August of 2006. R. p. 9. The Amended Coinplaint notes that as of 
November 30, 2007, Terra-West had performed all work required under the agreement, 
excepting additional excavation and installation of certain pipeline and irrigation work 
along and through the development, which could not be perfonned until certain approvals 
from government authorities were obtained by Urwin. R. p. 91. I-Iowever, subsequent to 
the original claim of lien's recording, Urwin obtained the necessary governmental approvals 
and instructed Terra-West to complete the remaining work under its original agreement with 
Red ClifFTUrwin. R. p. 91. Accordingly, Terra-West resumed its performance under the 
original agreement, providing labor and materials for the improvement ofthe property. Thus, 
while the amended pleading does relate to actions which occurred after the recording of the 
original claim of lien, all of Terra-West's claims relate to the same original agreement 
between Terra-West and Red ClifflUrwin. 
For that reason, the cases cited by Ida110 Mutual once again are clearly distinguishable 
from the amended pleading presented by Terra-West. Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss 
Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 (1991), sought to add a tort claim for 
defamation to the already existing contract related claims. In this case, Terra-West has not 
asserted any new theories of recovery. The original pleading asserts that it has provided 
services and inaterials upon real property, pursuant to an agreement with the owner, for which 
it has not been paid. The amended pleading simply adds the work that Terra-West performed 
pursuant to the same agreement. Terra-West has not changed the theory of its case between 
the amended pleading and the original pleading as the proposed amendment in Idaho First 
National sought to do. 
Likewise, in Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 688 P.2d 1172 (1984), the proposed 
amendment sought to add post-filing facts that did not relate to the facts presented in the 
original litigation, but rather "occurred at a different time and location." Wing, 107 Idaho at 
270, 688 P.2d at 1175. Terra-West's claims are not at a different time and location. The 
amendments concern acts rendered by Terra-West upon the same property, pursuant to the 
same agreement which is already put in issue by the existing litigation. 
It is well recognized that new theories of recovery may be raised when the basic 
facts that give rise to the recovery have not changed. Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 
Idaho 266, 272-73, 561 P.2d 1299, 1305-06 (1977). The basic facts giving rise to Terra- 
West's claims have not changed. Terra-West seeks recovery of amounts for labor and 
materials that it provided pursuant to an agreement made in August of 2006. The identity 
of the parties has not changed and, in point of fact, neither has Terra-West's theories of 
recovery. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the 
amended complaint arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence at issue in the 
original pleading and therefore relates back to that date. 
C. The District Court had jurisdiction to grant Terra-West's motion for leave to 
amend because the motion was timely and because no final order has been issued 
in this action. 
Idaho Mutual asserts that the district court does not have the jurisdictional power to 
enforce the Second Lien because, in Idaho Mutual's view, Terra-West failed to initiate an 
action for foreclose the lien within the six-month period provided in Idaho Code § 45-510. 
Idaho Mutual's argument, however, is without merit because Terra-West did commence 
proceedings to enforce the lien within the statutory period. 
Terra-West substantially completed work on the subject property on May 25,2008. 
The Second Claim of Lien was filed on August 12, 2008, and copies were served on the 
owners or reputed owners of the property. This filing was less than 90 days after work was 
completed, and was thus timely under Idaho Code § 45-507. Then, on January 16, 2009, 
Terra-West filed a motion to amend its complaint so as to enforce the Second Claim of 
Lien. This motion was filed approximately five months after the Claim of Lien was 
recorded, and was accordingly timely under the six-month limit contained in Idaho Code 5 
45-510. 
As discussed in greater detail in section V(a) above, the filing of a motion to amend 
constitutes the commencement of an action for the purposes of timeliness, with the motion 
to amend standing in place of the amended complaint while under review by the court. 
E.g., Nett, 774 N.E.2d at 140; Mayes, 867 F.2d at 1173; Wallace, 720 F.Supp. at 159; 
Longo, 618 F.Supp. at 89; Mauney, 340 S.E.2d at 400; Toy, 961 P.2d at 1037; Totura (5; 
Co, 754 So.2d at 680; Mauney, 340 S.E.2d at 400; Frazier, 55 S.W.3d at 929-30; The 
Children's Store, 580 A.2d at 1210. As a result, Terra-West's January 16, 2009 filing of 
the motion to amend the complaint constituted the commencement of proceedings to 
enforce the Second Lien against the Defendants. The Second Lien was therefore timely 
under Idaho Code 5 45-510 and the court was fully vested with jurisdiction to grant leave 
to amend the Complaint. 
Even if the amended complaint had not itself been timely filed, as discussed in 
greater detail in section V(b) above, it would have related back to the date of the original 
Complaint. Determination of whether an amended pleading relates back does not hinge on 
whether it is restricted by a statute of limitations or of repose, but instead depends on the 
same factors that normally govern the relation back doctrine. Estate of Spell, 622 S.E.2d 
725,728 (N.C. App. 2005). 
Further, the district court has never lost jurisdiction over Terra-West's Complaint, 
or even over the First Claim of Lien. On motion from Idaho Mutual, the district court 
dismissed Terra-West's First Claim of Lien on the basis of an alleged technical error in the 
jurat. R. p. 31-36. The dismissal was not, however, a final order. As noted by the district 
court in its ruling granting leave to amend, Idaho Mutual did not request, nor did it receive, 
a Rule 54@) certificate of Final Judgment removing it from the action. R. p. 84. 
Similarly, and for the same reason, no final order has ever been entered with 
respect to the dismissal of the First Claim of Lien and the district court retains its 
jurisdiction over that claim. The present appeal is interlocutory, and was granted on 
motion from Idaho Mutual by the Supreme Court pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12. 
Since no final judgment has ever been issued in this case, nothing has interrupted the 
district court's jurisdiction. Indeed, until a final order is issued, (and for 14 days 
afterward) Terra-West retains the ability to file a motion for reconsideration regarding the 
First Claim of Lien, and the district court retains the jurisdiction to entertain that motion - 
and potentially modify or reverse its earlier ruling of dismissal. I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B) ("A 
motioil for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any 
time before the entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry 
of final judgment"); Devil Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir & Canal Co., 126 
Idaho 202,879 P.2d 1135 (1994).' 
There is no question that Terra-West's filing of the original pleading was timely. 
Rule 15 was specifically created "to allow amendments to expand or cure defective 
pleadings" such as in the present case. See Herrera, 11 1 Idaho at 1018, 729 P.2d at 1081. 
Since the district court never lost jurisdiction over Idaho Mutual or over Terra-West's 
original Complaint, the district court had, and has, jurisdiction to apply the doctrine of 
relation back to the amended complaint. 
D. Idaho Mutual is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal. 
Idaho Mutual requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 5 12-121 and 
Idaho Appellate Rule 41. Idaho Appellate Rule 41 outlines the rules for requesting 
attorney fees, but does not itself provide a basis on which fees can be awarded. Shawver v. 
Huckleberry Estates, 140 Idaho 354, 365, 93 Idaho 685,696 (2004). Idaho Code 5 12-121 
permits an award of attorney fees in a civil action to the prevailing party if the court 
determines the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation. Mutual ofEnumclaw Ins. Co. v. Pedersen, 133 Idaho 135, 139, 983 P.2d 208, 
212 (1999). This action has not been defended frivolously by Terra-West, and, indeed, 
Terra-West is the responding party having been granted a favorable ruling on its motion to 
amend by the district court below. 
It sl~ould he noted that the question of whether or not the First Claim of Lien was valid is not determinative 
in the present appeal. Tile district court ruled that the amended complaint relates hack to the "original 
pleading" - the entire original pleading - simply to that of the original pleading that described the 
First Claim of Lien. R. p. 84. The original pleading concerned the same property and the same conduct, 
transaction, or occurre~~ce as the amended complaint and consequently serves as a basis for relation hack 
pursuant to Rule 15(c). See R. p. 6-13; I.R.C.P. 15(c). As a result, the amended complaint would relate hack 
to the original pleading even if the First Claim of Lien were invalid, and, indeed, even if the First Claim of 
Lien had never existed. 
E. Terra-West should be granted attorney's fees on appeal. 
Idaho Mutual requests an award of reasonable attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code 5 12-121, which provides for such an award if the court determines the case 
- . was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. 
Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 133 Idaho at 139, 983 P.2d at 212. Idaho Mutual's 
interlocutory appeal is frivolous in light of the well established rule that a motion to amend 
stands in the place of an amended pleading for the purposes of timeliness, and the clear 
absence of any abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that the claims in 
the amended complaint arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth 
in the original pleading. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Terra-West respectfully requests that the Court affirm the district court's 
discretionary grant of leave to file an amended complaint. Terra-West further requests an 
award of costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED this 8'" day of December, 2009. 
TROUT + JONES + GLEDHILL + FUHRMAN, P.A. 
~~n a d-. 
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